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ABSTRACT 
 
As the Internet of Things permeates every aspect of human life, assessing the credence or integrity of the data 
generated by “things” becomes a central exercise for making decisions or in auditing events. In this paper, we 
present a vision of this exercise that includes the notion of data credence, assessing data credence in an efficient 
manner, and the use of technologies that are on the horizon for the very large scale Internet of Things. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the next several years, we expect most environments 
to be “smart”, in that there are data from sensors or 
actuators networked with wired and wireless 
technologies that are part of the Internet of Things – 
IoT. IoT has created a world in which tremendous 
amounts of data, pertinent to a specific application 
scenario, are being collected from disparate sources. 
The data generated by “things” will likely be 
augmented by crowdsourced data sources and context 
information that can be utilized for (a) rapid intelligent 
decisions on a variety of mundane and specialized 
problems, and/or (b) auditing and forensics to explain 
or understand a complex system that may have led to a 
spectacular event. An example of the former is the use 
of sensors by a bank for continually monitoring crop 
levels and soil moisture in land that belongs to a farmer 
who is using the land and crops as collateral for a loan 
[20]. An example of the latter is the unfortunate crash 
of a suburban train in New Jersey's Hoboken station 
[29].  
In either case, we would expect the need to analyze 
data from a variety of sources -- data that may have 
intrinsic defects due to gaps in time and space (sensors 
located only in convenient areas or collecting data 
intermittently), fabricated or malicious data (due to 
adversaries), benign, yet erroneous data (measurement 
errors, cheaper sensors), data that have influence on the 
decision or forensics but may have been measured 
differently, with a coarser granularity (rainfall in the 
area around the farmer's land), or crowdsourced data (a 
tweet about the train's speed may provide an 
assessment of timing related to the accident). While the 
various data sources are related, their fidelity and 
reliability are highly varying. The ground truth of the 
data is not available, except that there is some level of 
trust in the devices that are gathering the data through 
the appropriate sensors or triggers. 
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Figure 1: The data credence stratum 
We expect that a central exercise in future 
environments will be assessing what we call data 
credence, which will provide a probabilistic range of 
confidence of the assessment of the data over time, 
allowing decisions to be dependable or audits to be 
trustworthy. Among the challenges that this assessment 
creates is the question of how we can assess and 
manage the credence in data in a general setting based 
on a priori  and evolving confidence of data from the 
numerous smart “things” and the relationships between 
the reported quantities in different dimensions such as 
space, time, security, semantics, granularity, and 
context. Next, assuming this is possible, specific 
problems that then result in are how to perform such an 
assessment in an efficient way (in terms of data 
storage, latency, and energy) and how the data sources 
that can be controlled can be tuned to achieve the 
desired level of credence, if and where/when possible. 
 In this paper, we discuss this vision in general in 
Section 2. We consider a layered approach (see Figure 
1), starting from what we call as the “credence stratum” 
in this section and show how this may work its way 
down to lower layers in later sections. In Section 3, we 
suggest the use of subjective logic and graph models as 
tools for assessing data credence. This section assumes 
honest data sources with benign or accidental errors. In 
Section 4 we discuss the challenges of fine tuning data 
credence that includes the use of cryptographic 
assurance of data. Section 5 looks at emerging 
technologies such as using multiple link layers and 
energy harvesting and how they may impact data 
credence. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2 DATA CREDENCE 
The vision we present here is one where there is a 
determination of the credence of  data in  the  emerging 
 
Figure 2: Example graph of types of and “links” 
between data sources 
world of very large scale deployments of things that 
can monitor parameters and also actuate behaviors that 
influence the environment. We assume that data 
credence is a probabilistic metric (between 0 and 1) 
with a certain confidence. This maps neatly into the 
ideas of subjective logic as described in the next 
section. But first, we consider a specific (limited) 
example to explain the big picture. 
2.1 Working Example of Bank and Farmer 
Figure 2 shows a mix of three types of data sources: 
The size of the circle indicates an a priori credence 
(larger = better), the line stroke of the circle indicates 
the granularity (thicker = more granular, dashed = 
coarse), links indicate whether or not a source is 
“close” enough to another, perhaps along the 
dimension of space, and the color indicates the security 
level (green = authenticated, blue = external but 
credible, red = wild). Only for the purposes of 
illustration, let us assume that the data credence in this 
scenario is important to a bank “Bob” that is providing 
a loan to a farmer “Fiona” using her crops as collateral. 
Bob would like to verify whether Fiona is capable of 
repaying her loan and also to monitor the changes in 
this capability over time to make decisions regarding 
future loans or foreclosure. 
Bob outsources this to a company “Owen” that 
deploys sensors in Fiona’s land to monitor soil 
moisture, chemicals, and crop height. These would be 
the “green” sensors that have been authenticated by 
Owen. To save costs, Owen has deals with Oscar and 
Ogden who have deployed “red” sensors in 
neighboring land (small circles because their credence 
is lower). These deployments may gain or lose 
credence through verifiable reporting over time and 
what we call as meta-sources (see Figure 1), which 
may include communication patterns, locations, quality 
of devices, and so on.  Further,  the  bank  has  external  
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Figure 3: Example of data sources (event area 
reports) with overlap in time 
knowledge from short and long-term weather reports 
and forecasts of crop viability from government reports 
(blue dashed circle - large because it is credible, dashed 
because it is coarse).  
Data from these disparate sources have to be 
combined to provide a metric (perhaps a single value) 
that can inform Bob of Fiona’s capability to repay 
loans (which is the decision to be made based on the 
credence of the data in question). This metric may be 
augmented over time with new data and by whether or 
not Fiona pays installments on the loan on time. 
2.2 Sources of Credence and Disrepute 
We can imagine that many sources add positively to 
the credence of data such as proximity and location, 
authentication, quality of measurements, previous 
reputation, and so on or on the contrary cause discredit 
to data. Consider an example of monitoring large 
outdoor events. This task requires large-scale 
information consolidation from heterogeneous data 
sources including infrastructure-based mobile systems, 
ad-hoc wireless networks and distributed Internet 
repositories.   
Figure 3 shows an example of two population 
reports for event area A1. In this example, the data 
credence stratum obtains the reports from alternative 
information sources. Report_1 is based on information 
estimated from surveillance cameras, while Report_2 
has been generated from a number of tweets posted by 
event participants and from communications within an 
ad hoc network of mobile devices of the event 
participants. Note that the reports estimate event 
population for overlapping time intervals with the total 
coverage from 10:00 to 11:30, and with overlap 
duration of 30mins. The task of the data credence 
stratum would be estimating the population dynamics 
within smaller time units (e.g., what was the most 
likely number of people in event area A1 from 10:30 to 
11:30?). 
In some cases, analysis of relationships between 
overlapping data sources may reveal data inconsistency 
 
Figure 4: Example of inconsistent data sources 
(event area reports) 
that helps to assess the data credence. For example, 
several reports may reflect different numbers of people 
for the same location and time interval. Figure 4 
illustrates a more complex case of inconsistency within 
four reports. The total number of R1 and R3 (550) 
should not be greater than the number reported in R2 
(500). The number reported in R3 (250) should also be 
smaller than the number or R4 (200). 
Consider a second example where a “thing” reports 
data to a sink about a phenomenon that it is monitoring. 
The data are sent at different times, some with 
cryptographic integrity checks and others without to 
save on computation and energy. The sink may attach 
more credence to data that has a verifiable integrity 
check and perhaps others that are close to it in time and 
content. In the latter case, the sink is looking at 
consistency of data, albeit in a different manner than 
that discussed in Figure 3. Credence here depends on 
verifiable integrity checks and proximity (defined with 
respect to the phenomenon) for those sources without 
integrity checks. 
2.3 Data Credence vs Data Integrity 
We argue that the notion of data credence is a superset 
of data integrity which is binary in nature. If there is 
(cryptographic) assurance that data came from the 
source from which they are supposed to have 
originated and that they have not been modified in any 
manner since then, we say that there is integrity of such 
data. If the cryptographic assurance fails, then the data 
cannot be trusted. However, in practice, it is virtually 
impossible (at this time) to ensure cryptographic 
integrity of all data, due to many factors. Such factors 
include technical ceilings on performance as well as 
issues such as cryptographic key management on the 
one side and policy, law, culture and human behavior 
on the other end. 
 Consider the issue of cryptographic key 
management. In a naïve setting, let us suppose that 
every message containing data from a “thing” has an 
integrity check using a (secret) key k. The challenges 
that arise are how we share the key and with whom. If 
the key is known to multiple entities, any one of them 
may modify the data without detection. From a 
network communications standpoint, the source “thing” 
and the destination (be it a gateway or the cloud) will 
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perhaps share one or more keys. However, once the 
data reaches the cloud, the “ground truth” can no 
longer be verified. One may argue that digital 
signatures can be employed for this purpose, but this 
becomes computationally expensive if each message 
has to have a signature – both from the standpoint of 
signing and for verification of signatures for billions of 
messages. 
In the meantime, it becomes necessary to use 
alternative techniques that evaluate the consistency of 
data as a means for credence as described next. To the 
best of our knowledge, using both data and 
cryptographic credence at the same time has not been 
previously investigated. 
2.4 Related Work 
The concept of data inconsistency and related concepts 
of data reliability have been explored mostly in the 
context of database management and data integration. 
The problems of data redundancy and inconsistency are 
of general applicability to large-scale Data Integration 
Systems. Data Integration Systems must address two 
major challenges: (1) heterogeneous data and (2) 
conflicting data. Resolving data heterogeneities has 
been the focus of active research and development for 
more than two decades [7] [19].  There are numerous 
tools for efficient mapping of data sources in a 
homogenous schema with proper data cleaning 
(eliminating typos, misspellings, and formatting 
errors), standardization of names, conversion of data 
types, duplicate elimination, etc. 
The amount of research in the area of data conflict 
resolution and querying inconsistent data is also 
considerable. The work in [12] [5] [3] [4] provided a 
comprehensive review of the current state of the art.  
Early research on handling inconsistencies was mostly 
theoretical and did not relate this problem directly to 
the data reliability [23]. Data inconsistency as a key 
integrity constraint violation was considered in [1]. 
Consistent query answering that ignores inconsistent 
data, thereby violating integrity constraints, was 
introduced in [8]. This approach is related to more 
recent research on query transformation for consistent 
query answering [40]. An alternative approach is based 
on inconsistent database repair, producing a minimally 
different – yet consistent -- database that satisfies 
integrity constraints [38], [6]. Our work on information 
integration based on crowdsourcing and historical data 
fusion represent a new research direction in this area 
[28] [43] [45] [44]. 
Since the pioneering work of Grant [16] that first 
investigated the measurement of inconsistencies, in the 
past 20 years researchers have been trying to find the 
best way to measure inconsistencies.  A good review of 
the research up to 2005 appears in [21]. Since then both 
additional inconsistency measures as well as properties 
that such an inconsistency measure should satisfy have 
been studied. The following are some of the important 
papers in this field: [22], [30], [31], [17], [18]. It turns 
out, as shown in [17] that the various proposed 
measurements are incompatible with one another, 
leading to the conclusion that the concept of 
inconsistency measure is too illusive to be captured by 
a single definition. So the best we can do is to find 
inconsistency measures that are the most appropriate in 
certain situations. Another issue here is that research on 
inconsistencies has been done primarily in an abstract 
setting using logic formulas. On the other hand, for the 
practical development of integrated systems 
researchers have used ad-hoc methods. 
In case of multiple data sources a straightforward 
way to assess data reliability is to use a majority voting 
as a criteria for the most reliable data item. Meanwhile, 
reliability of data providers should also be taken into 
account, and some research has been conducted in this 
area. The first group of methods relies on probabilistic 
data accuracy assessment [11], [13], [27], [41]. Dong, 
et al. [11] proposed an accuracy technique, which 
calculates probability of each value being correct and 
averages the confidence of facets provided by the 
source estimating the provider trustworthiness. A more 
advanced AccuracySimilarity approach also considers 
the similarities of alternative values.  Furthermore, [13] 
introduces a POPAccuaracy method assuming that 
false data value probability is uniformly distributed. A 
TruthFinder method, proposed by Yin, et al. in [41] 
differs from Accuracy by not normalizing the 
confidence score of each entity.  
The second group of methods is based on web link 
analysis [32], [42], [14]. In [32], Pasternack, et al., 
proposed three techniques: (1) AverageLog is a 
transformation of Hub-Authority algorithm assessing 
source trustworthiness as an averaged confidence score 
of provided values multiplied by the log of provided 
value count; (2) Investment, where the confidence 
score of the value grows exponentially with the 
accumulated providers’ trustworthiness; (3) 
PooledInvestment differs from the investment in that 
confidence score of data values grows linearly.  
The work in [42] proposed a semi-supervised 
reliability assessment method called SSTF. This 
method assumes that there is a set of entities having 
true value affecting the result of the PageRank iteration 
procedure. The work in [14] proposed a 2-Estimates 
transformation of Hub-Authority algorithm where 
provider trustworthiness is estimated as an average the 
vote count. They further proposed 3-Estimates, which 
additionally considers the trustworthiness of data 
values. Other methods include IR-based techniques 
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[14], [34]. For example, Galland et al., [14] suggest 
maintaining a vector for a data value with each 
dimension corresponding to a provider. The reliability 
of the provider is assessed as a cosine similarity 
between provided values and selected reference values. 
In [34], Pochampally et al., proposed a method 
measuring the source precision and recall, and the 
correlation information between sources, based on 
which the confidence score of data value is computed. 
None of the approaches discussed in this section 
take both inconsistency and assurance/integrity into 
account. In this paper we suggest an integrated data 
credence analysis exploring data redundancy and data 
inconsistencies so as to provide automatic data 
credence assessment that also takes into account issues 
of information assurance (through cryptographic 
methods). We consider an approach to discover data 
inconsistency through the analysis of relationships 
between data items and data sources with additional 
metrics that may include cryptographic assurance.  Our 
work is the first attempt to utilize efficient 
inconsistency analysis and information assurance for 
implementing a scalable data credence stratum. 
3 MODELING AND ASSESSING DATA 
CREDENCE 
In this section, we start with the first of the many 
challenges that we discuss in subsequent sections – that 
of modelling and assessing data credence. Subjective 
logic, first introduced by Jøsang [24], combined with a 
graph model (as in Figure 2) that captures relations that 
may support or discredit the credence, appear to be best 
suited for this purpose. Recently, subjective logic has 
been applied for reliability assessment in both social 
and regular sensor networks [33] [36]. Combining 
subjective logic with flow-based reputation has also 
been explored in [37], which allows combining 
subjective logic with graph models. We suggest this as 
one of the approaches for modeling and assessing data 
credence, and illustrate this through an example below, 
although our examples use them separately.  
Other approaches such as Bayesian inference, the 
Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence and Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation may be possible. The 
randomness in specific data sources may be 
characterized in some situations (e.g., location errors in 
GPS have known models) whereas it may be an 
assumption in other cases. Further, while ideally a joint 
probability distribution and the time variation in the 
case of stochastic processes would be the best for 
quantifying data credence (for example using 
confidence levels or outage probabilities – what is the 
probability that this data is correct within a specific 
range), most such analytical models are intractable 
unless sources are independent and processes are 
stationary. 
Primary Challenge: How do we assess data 
credence?  
We argue that traditional approaches for assessing data 
credence based on data consistency are insufficient in a 
world where we have disparate sources as described in 
Sections 1 and 2.1 with varying levels of a priori 
credence, much of which may be subjective. In this 
section, we assume that the sources are non-malicious 
and we relax this assumption later. 
Assuming the data credence stratum continuously 
receives new data from multiple sources, it becomes 
necessary to determine credence values for (i) data 
items/reports and (ii) sources of these data, both of 
which evolve with the availability of new evidence. It 
becomes necessary to evaluate internal credence and 
external credence of data. It may be possible to use 
measures of “inconsistency” caused by a data source to 
assess its internal credence. While the assessment of 
internal credence can be a completely automated 
process based on objective metrics, it may be necessary 
in a human world to allow end-users to submit their 
subjective feedback on reliability of data and data 
providers to assess external credence (For example, 
how much trust would Owen put on Ogden Vs Oscar in 
Section 2.1?). With regards to the level of assessment, 
a local as well as a global credence may be necessary. 
The local credence value would be related to a single 
data item (e.g., report from a proximate thing), while 
the global one is related to a data provider/data source 
(Is the sensor from Ogden?). We explain these ideas 
next. 
Internal credence: Handling internal credence requires 
solving the following two tasks: (1) finding efficient 
strategies to check for inconsistencies among data 
sources, and (2) finding the least intrusive 
inconsistency resolution strategy (this assumes sources 
are not malicious, but may be riddled with benign 
errors). For the first task, a considerable challenge is to 
optimize the inconsistency inference so it scales for 
large amounts of data. For the second task, we need to 
explore various minimal database reduction strategies 
to recover consistency. For example, in Figure 4 we 
can remove any of reports R1, R2, or R4 and this will 
reduce the degree of inconsistency. Meanwhile, 
removing report R3 eliminates inconsistency entirely, 
and thus represents the least intrusive inconsistency 
resolution. This also indicates a high probability for R3 
to be the least reliable report reducing its credence. 
With respect to the local (l) and global (g) 
consistency, there exist interdependencies: It is likely 
that there will be a large number of the former that may 
be utilized to compute the latter. Local internal 
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credence of a single data item/report may be assessed 
based on the inconsistencies with which it is 
associated, and then we may use a group of reports and 
their estimated credence to approximate the global 
internal credence of the data source. Each report may 
then be annotated with an internal credence tuple <l, 
g>, which includes the reliability for both the specific 
report and its source/provider. Maintaining the tuple 
may address the following problem: If we keep track of 
only the local credence, we may end up with a low 
credence value for a report that is actually accurate.  
For instance, consider the two conflicting reports on 
number of people in an area A1 between 10:00 and 
11:00. Report R1 (from source s1) mentions 0 
population, while report R2 (from source s2) mentions 
100 people. No other reports for this period are 
available. If we estimate local credence of the reports 
based on the inconsistencies caused by each of them, 
we obtain a local credence of 0.5 for both R1 and R2. 
Meanwhile, the global credence of a source will reflect 
its accuracy and permit more adequate data assessment. 
Based on previous reports from s1 and s2, we might 
reach global credence assessments of 0.3 and 0.8, 
respectively. Since their local credence is the same, we 
can use the global credence to increase or decrease our 
confidence in the data provided by each report. 
External credence: We envision that users will be able 
to contribute their subjective data credence assessments 
on reports submitted either by themselves or by their 
peers. For instance, in the case where a contributor 
annotates her own reports with a reliability opinion, she 
might be aware of possible inaccuracies due to the 
method in which the data were obtained. Furthermore, 
she might be confident that the reliability of a 
conflicting report is low, due to her strong confidence 
in her own data.  There is a need to explore the 
challenges in external credence assessment and 
investigate a combined credence assessment.   
We next elaborate on the credence computation 
using Subjective Logic, as an example. 
Subjective logic: Let t, d and u be non-negative values 
such that 𝑡 + 𝑑 + 𝑢 = 1 and {𝑡, 𝑑, 𝑢} ∈ [0,1]. Then, a 
triple 𝜔 = {𝑡, 𝑑, 𝑢} is called an opinion, where 
components t, d, and u represent levels of trust, distrust 
and uncertainty. For example, high distrust with some 
uncertainty (10%) could be expressed as an 
opinion 𝜔1 = {0.0,0.9,0.1}, while high trust with lesser 
uncertainty of (4%) could be expressed as opinion 
𝜔2 = {0.96,0.0,0.04}. By varying these parameters, we 
can express different levels of reliability in terms of 
which we can assess data credence. Subjective logic 
also provides a set of logical operators for combining 
opinions including conjunction, recommendation, and 
consensus. More details can be found in [24]. In our 
previous work [33], [36], we have successfully used 
subjective logic to express trust propagation in wireless 
sensor networks and in social networks. In this paper, 
we suggest its use towards scalable assessment of data 
credence.  
Local internal credence: Every single source/report r 
can be deemed reliable or not with respect to its degree 
of inconsistency. It is possible to measure this degree 
through the percentage of inconsistent conflicts in 
which r is participating. For instance, let us assume that 
r reports on a time interval [a, b] for data item X. Let us 
further assume that there are k reports that are related to 
data item X and their time interval partially or 
completely overlaps with [a, b]. Then if r is 
inconsistent with m of those reports, we can calculate 
its local credence (simple approach) as 𝐿𝑇(𝑟) = 1 −
𝑚
𝑘
. 
This calculation, however, provides a single point 
estimate for the local reliability, without considering 
the uncertainty of the assessment.  
To assess the local credence of an opinion triplet, 
we can utilize the concept of inconsistency level (IL). 
We define an inconsistency group as a set of reports 
that have mutual inconsistencies. Then 𝐼𝐿(𝑟, 𝐺) = 0, if 
r is not a part of G; otherwise 𝐼𝐿(𝑟, 𝐺) =
1
|𝐺|
. Hence, we 
can calculate IL(r, G), for each inconsistency group G. 
Next we can estimate a mean inconsistency level ILmean 
of r and the corresponding standard deviation ILstdev. 
We then define the local distrust on report r in the 
interval:  
[max {0, 𝐼𝐿𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 − (
𝐼𝐿𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣
2
)} , min {0, 𝐼𝐿𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 + (
𝐼𝐿𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣
2
)}].  
Using a simple transformation, we can obtain the 
reliability of an opinion triplet. Assuming that the local 
distrust interval for r is [y, z], we have  
𝑤1
𝑛(𝑟) = {1 −
𝑦 + 𝑧
2
−
𝑧 − 𝑦
2
,
𝑦 + 𝑧
2
,
𝑧 − 𝑦
2
} 
as the local credence of the report r produced from 
source n.  
To demonstrate assessing local credence of each 
report, consider the example in Figure 4. First, we need 
to find the inconsistency groups: G1 = {R1, R2, R3} 
and G2 = {R3, R4}. Then IL(R1, G1) = 1/3, IL(R1, G2) 
= 0, ILmean(R1) = 0.167, and ILstdev(R1) = 0.236. The 
distrust interval of R1 is [max{0, 0.049}, min{1, 
0.386}]=[0.049, 0.386] and its local reliability opinion 
is ω1(r1)={0.614,0.218,0.169}. Similarly, local 
reliability opinions for the rest of the reports are ω1(r2)  
= {0.614,0.218,0.169}, ω1(r3) = {0.465, 0.417, 0.118}, 
and ω1(r4) = {0.573,  0.25, 0.177}. 
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Figure 5. (top) Global credence in terms of 
reliability assessment: using the whole submission 
history; (bottom) Using the last 10 reports 
Global internal credence: After obtaining local 
reliabilities of each report, we assess the global 
credence of their provider P. Each report i submitted by 
P is accompanied by a local reliability opinion 𝜔𝑖
𝑛 
obtained through the process described above. To 
assess the global credence, we propose to aggregate 
them using the consensus operator of subjective logic 
[24]. We assume that every report is an agent, reporting 
on the reliability of its provider through the local 
reliability opinions. In brief, if  𝜔1
𝑛(𝑖) = {𝑡𝑖, 𝑑𝑖 , 𝑢𝑖} and 
 𝜔1
𝑛(𝑗) = {𝑡𝑗 , 𝑑𝑗 , 𝑢𝑗}, then their consensus is the 
opinion:  
 𝑤𝑖,𝑗
𝑛 = {
𝑡𝑖𝑢𝑗 + 𝑡𝑗𝑢𝑖
𝑘
,
𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑗 + 𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑖
𝑘
,
𝑢𝑖𝑢𝑗
𝑘
} 
where k=ui+uj-uiuj. Let us assume that provider Jack 
submitted all of the reports considered in the previous 
paragraph. Above, we calculated the local reliability 
opinions for all of the reports. The consensus of the 
opinions gives as the global credence opinion for Jack, 
which in our case is: ωr1,r2,r3,r4Jack ={0.629, 0.328, 
0.044}. An interesting observation is that the consensus 
operator considerably reduces uncertainty: The more 
opinions we combine, the more certain the global 
opinion. Notice that the consensus of only the first two 
reports results in uncertainty of 0.092. Adding the third 
report reduces the uncertainty to 0.055, while the 
consensus of all 4 opinions results in the lowest 
uncertainty of 0.044. 
 
Figure 6. Example of an Inconsistency Graph 
 
Figure 5 shows a simulated internal global credence 
assessment for a data source which provided 800 
reports. The yellow line reflects the real user’s 
reliability over time used in the simulations. In the left 
figure, we use the complete set of reports from the 
provider to assess her/his reliability, while on the right 
one we use only the 10 most recent reports. As we can 
see in the latter case, we are able to react to the 
reliability dynamic much faster. 
External credence: To handle external credence 
assessment, the rating process enables users to provide 
an external reliability opinion on data. Here, they can 
also provide external opinions on the global reliability 
of a provider (e.g., if they are aware of faulty data 
gathering etc.). These external opinions can be fused 
using the recommendation operator of subjective logic. 
When a user (say Jack) provides an external reliability 
opinion (local or global) ωext, the system can use its 
own opinion on Jack’s external reports in conjunction 
with ωext to obtain a final external (local or global) 
reliability recommendation. 
Another approach that we propose towards 
assessing data credence is to represent conflicting data 
in the form of an Inconsistency Graph and to use 
efficient graph analysis techniques (e.g., based on a 
modification of the well-known page-rank algorithm). 
We can generate the Inconsistency Graph (IG) with 
nodes corresponding to different data sources or data 
items and edges reflecting inconsistencies between the 
data source/items.  Graphs with higher connectivity 
correspond to data with lower credence. For each node, 
higher connectivity means lower credence/reliability. 
Inconsistency with less reliable nodes is less severe 
than inconsistency with more credible nodes. 
Disconnected nodes correspond to data sources/items 
with the highest credence.  
 Figure 6 shows an example of an IG reflecting 
conflicts among three data sources providing event area 
reports from Figure 4. Here we assume that data source 
Charlie provides the report R4, while Beta provides R2. 
Both Charlie and Beta conflict with the data source 
Alpha providing the report R3. Note, that the conflict 
between Alpha and Charlie is more severe than the 
conflict between Alpha and Beta, since R3 contradicts 
R2 in combination with R1.  Both  number  of  conflicts 
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Figure 7: Credence in a mix of trusted and untrusted network paths 
and conflict severity should be taken into account to 
evaluate the credence of each of the data sources. 
We can evaluate the credence of each node in an 
Inconsistency Graph extending spreading activation 
models and Appleseed model [9] [46].  Under this 
approach we inject an initial energy to each node and 
have it propagated to other nodes along the IG edges 
until the energy distribution on all nodes converged. 
The IG edges are also updated continuously during the 
energy propagation based on the current energy 
distribution on each node as follows: 
𝐼𝐺(𝑖, 𝑗) = −𝑙𝑜𝑔10 (
𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦(𝑗)
∑ 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦(𝑖)𝑁𝑖=1
)  
Nodes with the higher final energy are considered less 
reliable and with lower credence. 
We note here that the IG approach uses only the 
actual reports and not the subjective assessments of 
credibility (that may come from the <l,g> tuples). A 
challenge we envision is combining the graph approach 
with subjective logic, which may be possible with new 
methods for conjunction, consensus, and discounting 
proposed in [37]. 
4 TUNING DATA CREDENCE 
In this section we consider major challenges in tuning 
the data credence stratum considered in previous 
sections. Challenges that exist include assessing 
credence in the presence of malicious actors, 
identifying relationships between data sources, and 
efficiency considerations. We elaborate on these 
challenges below. 
Challenge 1: How do we authenticate for credence? 
The data credence stratum must consider the 
authenticity of the data using both network level 
security and cryptographic metrics. In the previous 
section, we introduced data credence metrics using 
subjective logic, and these have to be amended with 
security metrics in the presence of malicious actors. 
While there are no standard metrics for assessing the 
network level security, it may be possible to use 
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quantifiable metrics, such as the number of hops (see 
for example [2]), link and end-to-end security protocols 
in use, key management in the system of interest (e.g., 
how fresh are keys) etc. An illustration of these issues 
is shown in Figure 7. The red sources have no 
authentication or integrity, the blue hexagons have only 
link-level authentication with a private access point 
(AP) and the green sensors have both link and end-to-
end authentication. 
Cryptographic metrics may also be characterized 
quantitatively based on the algorithms and key sizes 
(for example, using well known public estimates such 
as https://www.keylength.com). In the case of stored 
data, we suggest to include the effects of encrypted 
storage, storage ownership, and integrity checks of data 
blocks in models for credence assessment. These 
metrics may be incorporated in the internal credence 
model both locally (for data sources and blocks) and 
globally for a provider of different data sources. To the 
best of our knowledge, using both data and 
cryptographic credence at the same time has not been 
previously investigated. 
Challenge 2: How do we assess relationships 
between data sources?  
Often times, it is not clear as to which data source is 
related with which other data sources. Identifying the 
links for the inconsistency graph in Section 3 may not 
be a trivial problem. For example, sources that are 
close together in space should be part of the same 
group, but if the uncertainty in the location is very 
large, this may be an indication of whether or not it 
belongs to the set of data sources to be considered. We 
may know that a sensor is reporting soil moisture and it 
is in the vicinity of Fiona’s farmland, but the precise 
location may not be available. We suggest to employ 
techniques from network science for this purpose. 
Research work in network science (see for example 
[10]) looks at group detection in social networks using 
stochastic models of link emissions from group entities 
and a maximum likelihood clustering. 
Challenge 3: How do we improve data credence?  
In some applications, it may be inevitable that 
deployment of additional sources in the field is the only 
option to improve data credence, because of the 
inconsistencies or sparsity of reports to adequately 
quantify the credence. For example, if the 
inconsistencies are due to large geographical 
separation, it may be useful to deploy additional 
sensors in the field to obtain higher granularity in 
space. In general, we expect the dimensions of the data 
credence assessment problem and the capability of the 
data sources to influence this additional deployment – 
as another example, if a sensor is unable to provide 
samples in time at a specific granularity, a duplicate 
sensor whose samples are offset in time may be an 
option. 
Consider the example of the bank Bob and Fiona. If 
the data credence desired by the bank Bob is below an 
acceptable level, what strategies can Bob adopt? Two 
of the many possibilities are perhaps increasing the 
integrity of some of the less credible sources or adding 
more sources. For the sake of illustration, let us 
suppose that some of the sources deployed by Owen do 
not employ cryptographic protocols, raising the 
possibility that their reports could be modified reducing 
data credence. Addressing this may involve the use of 
integrity checks or better cryptographic techniques, or 
more granular samples in time – all of which may 
impact the battery life of sensors. Alternatively, only 
specific reports (either periodically or randomly) may 
be attached with integrity checks, which will enable the 
assessment of credence of the check-free reports. An 
alternative approach may involve either getting 
additional data from Oscar or Ogden or the deployment 
of additional sensors by the outsourced company 
Owen. The question that needs to be addressed is what 
strategies will provide the best result and are the most 
efficient in terms of deployment costs or energy costs 
at the sensors. 
Challenge 4:  How can we use cryptography 
efficiently for data credence?  
As a second example consider the issue of auditing or 
forensics. Let us suppose that the storage cost of all of 
the collected data is unacceptable. How much data 
should be stored to have a specific level of data 
credence in the case of a needed audit? Should all of 
the stored data have integrity checks? Are there 
suitable data structures that can be used to reduce the 
storage/computational burden (see for example work 
that looks at detecting modifications in stored data in 
an untrusted cloud in [15])? These are open questions 
and challenges that need to be addressed for data 
credence. 
5 TECHNOLOGIES ON THE HORIZON 
In this section we describe two recent technological 
advances that introduce the potential for improving 
data credence but have inherent challenges as well. 
Challenge 1: How can we exploit multiple link layer 
technologies for data credence?  
There are multiple communications technologies that 
can support data exchange between “things”. This 
includes long-range wireless RF-based technologies 
(such as GPRS, LoRa, Sigfox); short-range wireless 
RF-based technologies, free-space optical 
communications (e.g., visible light communications, 
Infrared-based communications), and wired 
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technologies (power line communications, Ethernet, 
optical fibers). Each link technology has its unique 
features and associated credibility (interface-dependent 
credibility). For example, data exchanged over wired 
medium is less likely to be spoofed compared to data 
exchanged over a wireless interface (assuming that it is 
hard to physically get access to the wired medium). 
Similarly, data exchanged through optical wireless 
interface is confined in space, and hence is inherently 
more secure than wireless radio-frequency interfaces 
[25] that may be attacked from farther distances.  
Multiple communication interfaces can jointly be 
utilized in assessing and/or improving data credence. 
When multiple link technologies are exploited, the 
interface with higher reliability could help in enhancing 
the reliability of data exchanged over other interfaces. 
For example, visible light communications can be used 
to establish secure keys over RF links; consider a thing 
A that sends a master key to things B and C through 
visible light communications when they are in close 
proximity, then B and C use this key to establish 
session keys over wireless RF channels [39]. This 
enables secure key establishment and hence improves 
the reliability of data exchanged over RF. 
Data exchanged over different interfaces can be 
correlated or fused (as in Figure 2, but even between 
the same pairs of things). By extracting correlated 
information and/or fusing data, the a priori credibility 
of information can be improved. For example, consider 
a network where some devices have an interface that 
allows communications using optical signals and 
another that uses RF. The advantage of using optical 
signals between things and a network infrastructure 
are: (a) ensuring that only things within the same 
physical location (where the information/data is 
relevant) will receive it; (b) minimizing interference on 
RF links; (c) enabling more reliable communications, 
since optical communications is less susceptible to 
attacks (e.g., eavesdropping - passive or replay- active 
attacks). In this case, under good weather conditions, 
the data exchanges over optical wireless channels may 
be associated with higher credence than data received 
over RF. In other words, the different links of a data 
source may have varying levels of internal credence! 
The challenges here lie in adapting these 
technologies for improving data credence. Not all 
things are likely to have multiple interfaces, and there 
will likely be a mix of devices in a given 
environment/application. Efficiently deploying 
technologies to improve credence will be an ongoing 
challenge. 
 
 
Challenge 2: What constraints/benefits do energy 
harvesting schemes bring to assessment of data 
credence?  
The second emerging technology of interest is wireless 
energy harvesting. Devices can exploit the ever-
increasing volume of wireless communications to 
harvest energy [26], hence prolong their lifetime. It is 
to be noted that different link technologies can be used 
for energy harvesting. In [35], energy is harvested from 
the received wireless optical signal, which is then used 
for transmitting RF signals. A simple view of energy 
harvesting is that devices have a “duty cycle” where 
things need time to recharge their batteries using 
ambient wireless signals which is significantly larger 
than the time for which they can transmit sensed data 
or take actions based on triggers. This duty cycle 
imposes constraints on the data credence (Is the sensed 
data sampled adequately?). 
Among the challenges with energy harvesting are 
how things should be dispersed/deployed for satisfying 
a level of data credence for an application. For 
example, different “things” may be triggered with 
offset duty cycles, but such things may have varying 
levels of internal and external credence. Tuning and 
optimizing the deployment will have interesting 
problems to solve, in a manner similar to case of the 
multiple links. 
6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We propose a vision with a systematic approach to 
maintain a data credence stratum assessing the 
credence or integrity of the data generated by Internet 
of Things. We suggest an integrated data credence 
analysis exploring data redundancy and data 
inconsistencies so as to provide automatic data 
credence assessment that also takes into account issues 
of information assurance (through cryptographic 
methods). We consider an approach to discover data 
inconsistency through the analysis of relationships 
between data items and data sources with additional 
metrics that may include cryptographic assurance.  Our 
work is the first attempt to envision and utilize efficient 
inconsistency analysis and information assurance for 
implementing a scalable data credence stratum. 
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